The first regards the singular lack of attention the subject receives in Locke's most important and influential published works; not only did Locke never publish a work devoted to moral philosophy, but he dedicates little space to its discussion in the works he did publish. The traditional moral concept of natural law arises in Locke's Two Treatises of Government serving as a major plank in his argument regarding the basis for civil law and the protection of individual liberty, but he does not go into any detail regarding how we come to know natural law nor how we might be obligated, or even motivated, to obey it. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding first edition ; fourth editionhereafter referred to as the Essay Locke spends little time discussing morality, and what he does provide in the way of a moral epistemology seems underdeveloped, offering, at best, the suggestion of what a moral system might look like rather than a fully-realized positive moral position. This brings us to the second major stumbling block:
Ontological Issues What sorts of things are these candidates? In particular, should the bearers of truth-values be regarded as being linguistic items and, as a consequence, items within specific languagesor are they non-linguistic items, or are they both?
In addition, should they be regarded as being concrete entities, i. Sentences are linguistic items: However, the term "sentence" has two senses: These three English sentence-tokens are all of the same sentence-type: Saturn is the sixth planet from the Sun. Sentence-tokens are concrete objects.
They are composed of ink marks on paper, or sequences of sounds, or patches of light on a computer monitor, etc. Sentence-tokens exist in space and time; they can be located in space and can be dated. They are abstract objects. Analogous distinctions can be made for letters, for words, for numerals, for musical notes on a stave, indeed for any symbols whatsoever.
Might sentence-tokens be the bearers of truth-values? One reason to favor tokens over types is to solve the problems involving so-called "indexical" or "token reflexive" terms such as "I" and "here" and "now". Is the claim expressed by the sentence-type "I like chocolate" true or false?
Well, it depends on who "I" is referring to. If Jack, who likes chocolate, says "I like chocolate", then what he has said is true; but if Jill, who dislikes chocolate, says "I like chocolate", then what she has said is false.
If it were sentence-types which were the bearers of truth-values, then the sentence-type "I like chocolate" would be both true and false — an unacceptable contradiction.
The contradiction is avoided, however, if one argues that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values, for in this case although there is only one sentence-type involved, there are two distinct sentence-tokens.
A second reason for arguing that sentence-tokens, rather than sentence-types, are the bearers of truth-values has been advanced by nominalist philosophers.
Nominalists are intent to allow as few abstract objects as possible. Insofar as sentence-types are abstract objects and sentence-tokens are concrete objects, nominalists will argue that actually uttered or written sentence-tokens are the proper bearers of truth-values.
But the theory that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values has its own problems. One objection to the nominalist theory is that had there never been any language-users, then there would be no truths.
And the same objection can be leveled against arguing that it is beliefs that are the bearers of truth-values: And a second objection — to the theory that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values — is that even though there are language-users, there are sentences that have never been uttered and never will be.
Consider, for example, the distinct number of different ways that a deck of playing cards can be arranged.
And there are countless other examples as well. Sentence-tokens, then, cannot be identified as the bearers of truth-values — there simply are too few sentence-tokens. Thus both theories — i that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values, and ii that sentence-types are the bearers of truth-values — encounter difficulties.
Might propositions be the bearers of truth-values? To escape the dilemma of choosing between tokens and types, propositions have been suggested as the primary bearers of truth-values.
The following five sentences are in different languages, but they all are typically used to express the same proposition or statement.
By contrast, what these five sentences say does depend partly on human convention. Had English speakers chosen to adopt the word "Saturn" as the name of a different particular planet, the first sentence would have expressed something false.
By choosing propositions rather than sentences as the bearers of truth-values, this relativity to human conventions does not apply to truth, a point that many philosophers would consider to be a virtue in a theory of truth.
Propositions are abstract entities; they do not exist in space and time. They are sometimes said to be "timeless", "eternal", or "omnitemporal" entities.
Terminology aside, the essential point is that propositions are not concrete or material objects. Nor, for that matter, are they mental entities; they are not "thoughts" as Frege had suggested in the nineteenth century. The theory that propositions are the bearers of truth-values also has been criticized.
Nominalists object to the abstract character of propositions. The relationship between sentences and propositions is a serious philosophical problem. Because it is the more favored theory, and for the sake of expediency and consistency, the theory that propositions — and not sentences — are the bearers of truth-values will be adopted in this article.Moral understanding is a species of knowledge.
Understanding why an action is wrong, for example, amounts to knowing why the action is wrong. The claim that moral understanding is immune to luck while moral knowledge is not does not withstand scrutiny; nor does the idea that there is something deep.
Socratic Logic: A Logic Text using Socratic Method, Platonic Questions, and Aristotelian Principles, Edition 3rd Edition. BOOK III.
BEFORE speaking of the different forms of government, let us try to fix the exact sense of the word, which has not yet been very clearly explained.. 1. GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL. I WARN the reader that this chapter requires careful reading, and that I am unable to make myself clear to those who refuse to be attentive.
Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one. One of the central tenets of science is to define a problem to be studied with as much clarity as possible, and the key to clear communication is calling things what they really are. Unfortunately, both the American media and public intellectuals have failed to be honest in identifying what everyone in Europe knows is the primary source of terrorism in the world today: Islam.
When I was an undergraduate, I believed that the prevalence of positivism in the social sciences – the idea of studying social phenomena in an “objective” or “value-free” manner – . Fideisms Judaism is the Semitic monotheistic fideist religion based on the Old Testament's ( BCE) rules for the worship of Yahweh by his chosen people, the children of Abraham's son Isaac (c BCE)..
Zoroastrianism is the Persian monotheistic fideist religion founded by Zarathustra (cc BCE) and which teaches that good must be chosen over evil in order to achieve salvation.